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KANT AS INTERNALIST:
THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PROPOSITION OF KANT'S ETHICAL THEORY
NELSON T. POTTER
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

Kant claims that his categorical imperative is a synthetic, a priori
proposition, but he does not make clear what makes this proposition
synthetic or a priori. In this essay it is argued that in Kant's view the
proposition is synthetic a priori because it states a quasi-psychological
fact: that rational beings are capable of acting from purely moral motives. This means that Kant is an "internalist" in W.D. Falk's sense.

t t t

formulations of the categorical imperative, which he claims
are equivalent to what is commonly called the "first formulation." He (1902-42, 4:413) says:
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: "Act only on that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law. "

I

Kant tells us that the categorical imperative is a synthetic a priori proposition (1902-42, 4:420). We know from the
Critique of Pure Reason that such propositions are likely to
be very important but also very difficult to justify. And,
indeed, we find that Kant believes the categorical imperative
to state a very important proposition and to be very difficult
to justify (1902-42, 4:420, 444-445). Further, he believes it
important to justify this proposition, because if it cannot be
justified, then morality may be merely a "phantom of the
brain" (1902-42, 4:445). Although Kant covers much difficult and important ground in moral theory in the first two
chapters of the Grundlegung, he leaves the task of justification
of the categorical imperative to the notoriously difficult and
obscure third and final chapter.
In this paper I wish, first, to set forth briefly an interpretation of what the synthetic a priori proposition is that
Kant is seeking to justify. What this proposition is is not
obvious; indeed, though little has been written on this subject
in recent literature, there is potential for controversy and
dispute. It seems important to understand just what this
proposition is because without such knowledge we cannot
understand Kant's attempted justification of the proposition.

Second, I will discuss briefly some consequences of my
interpretation, and in particular the idea that Kant is an
"internalist" in Falk's (1947-8) and Frankena's (1958) sense
of that term.
Finally, in an appendix I will mention a textual problem
faced by this and other interpretations of Kant on this point.
II

As is well known, Kant states a number of different

The emphasized proposition might not seem a prormsmg
candidate for a synthetic a priori proposition. For one thing,
it is an imperative. Usually only sentences in the indicative
are said to be either synthetic or analytic, but this is easily
remedied, for Kant says that "imperatives are expressed by an
ought." Thus we may rewrite the categorical imperative:
(persons) ought to act only on maxims through
which they can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law .
And, to make the subject-predicate nature of the proposition
more explicit, we might further rewrite it:
(persons) are things that ought to act only on
maxims, etc.
We might further ask just what Kant intends the subject
of the sentence to be, the subject which we have so far indicated with an expression intended to be as neutral as possible"Persons." There are strong textual indications, both in the
Grundlegung and elsewhere, that Kant intends the subject to
be ''rational beings" or "a rational being" (1902-42, 4:42On,
426427,435,438,440; 5 :46; 4:26-28).
Furthermore, let us alter our predicate so that we may
concentrate our discussion on the issues of present interest.
In Chapter One of the Grundlegung, Kant analyzes the concept of the good will, showing by conceptual analysis (admittedly controversial) that a good will acts only from the
motive of duty and that the principle of actions from the
motive of duty is the purely formal principle that is stated by
the first formulation of the categorical imperative (1974).
The point of this analysis, it seems to me, is to analyze the
general concept of morality, or the idea of what it is to be in
possession of a moral nature. I propose to substitute the pre185

analytic concept of having a moral nature for the analyzed
formulation of the categorical imperative, because the issues
I wish to consider in this essay do not deal with whether the
Kantian analysis of these concepts is correct or with, for
example, relations between the different formulations of the
categorical imperative, but rather with these pre-analytic
concepts and the light that consideration of them may throw
on the nature of "the categorical imperative." Thus, we
have the following principle, stated in largely pre-analytic
terms, a principle which is presupposed by the categorical
imperative:
A rational being is a being with a moral nature.
This proposition, then, is synthetic a priori (190242, 4:
26-28).
But just what does it mean to be in possession of a moral
nature? I would like to suggest three possible meanings:
(1)

To be subject to the moral law in the sense of
being morally responsible for one's actions.

(2)

To be aware of moral principles, moral considerations, on occasion to judge one's own and others'
actions by moral principles, perhaps on occasion
to feel guilt, indignation, and other moral feelings.

(3)

To be capable of acting from purely moral motives.

Kant pretty clearly intended (1) as part of the meaning of morality. Surely for Kant to be a moral being and not
to be accountable for one's actions would be a contradiction.
At times Kant seems even to use "accountable" and "moral"
as synonyms (190242,4:26-28).
It also seems that the kinds of things mentioned under
(2) are, in Kant's view, associated with having a moral nature.
Kant discusses moral emotions, in particular "respect," as an
important ethical concept and an indispensible moral emotion
(190242, 4 :400; 5 :7lff). The idea that we are conscious of a
"moral law within" ourselves is a recurring idea in Kant's
moral philosophy (190242, 5:29-30, 161); this consciousness
serves a key role in the very justification of the categorical
imperative in the second Critique (190242, 5:29-31). Finally, when we read Kant's lectures on education (they are
primarily on moral education), we fmd that he believes that
the moral law is within each of us; education consists only
of leading it out and bringing it to full consciousness (190242,9:437-500).
But it might be asked: Are these characteristic moral
phenomena analytically or synthetically associated with the
concept of a moral being, or of morality as such? Perhaps, for
example, respect, though in Kant's view clearly associated
with morality for all human beings, is not, according to
186

him, part of the concept of morality, but rather simply an
associated phenomenon. I think this objection is difficult to
answer. Some of the things mentioned under (2) may well
have been intended by Kant to be part of the concept of
morality or of a moral being, but it would be, I believe, difficult to show. Thus, for the present we must leave the question
of meaning (2) unresolved.
Is (3) a part of the meaning of "moral being"? Before
trying to answer this question, let us consider briefly what it
means if the answer is "yes." One of the more interesting
consequences is that Kant would be an internalist, in the
meaning of that term used by W.D. Falk (1947-8) and William
Frankena (1958). An ''internalist'' believes that a reference
to the existence of motives in the agent must be made in the
analysis of a moral judgment; the "externalist" denies this
(1958:41). If (3) is true, i.e., if to be a moral being one must
be capable of acting from purely moral motives, then, since
moral judgments are true only of moral beings, one of the
truth conditions for any moral judgment (and hence part of
its meaning) will be the proposition that the agent is capable
of acting from purely moral motives. (perhaps it is worth
noting here that Kant believes that even the morally evil and
depraved man will be moved to act out of moral motives in
cases where such action will not conflict with his own selfish
desires and interests; hence in Kant's view, moral motivation
will not be a mere theoretical capability, but a dispositional
motive in the sense of "an occurrent motive under certain
conditions. ")

Let us ask again, Is (3) also part of the meaning of
"moral being"? I think the correct answer is "Yes." Throughout the Grundlegung Kant is concerned with moral motivation when he is discussing the categorical imperative. For
example, at the beginning of Chapter Two, when he is considering the question of whether morality may not be a
"phantom of the human imagination" (190242, 4 :407), the
question he considers is whether a morally motivated action
has ever been performed (190242,4:407408). And Kantwhen he raises in Chapter Two the question of whether the
categorical imperative is "possible"-seems to be asking,
once again, a question about the possibility of moral motivation (190242, 4:417420). Again, his discussion of autonomy
is largely in terms of motivation; heteronomy is said to be the
will's being determined by something outside itself; whereas,
autonomy is the will's self-determination (190242, 4:431433). Also, in the second Critique, the question is stated: Can
pure reason be practical? And if pure reason can be practical,
this means, Kant tells us, that " ... of itself and independently
of everything empirical it [Le., pure reason] can determine
the will" (190242, 5 :42). So, once again, the question concerns "determination of the will" and, hence, motivation.
If (3) is, indeed, correct, that is, if to be a moral being
is to be capable of acting from purely moral motivation, and
if Kant, in justifying the categorical imperative, is mainly
trying to justify the proposition that all rational beings possess

this capability (in virtue of their being moral beings), what
follows?

preting it or dealing with the problems that it presents to
the interpreter.

A. We might ask, why should Kant feel the necessity
of some purely rational, non-sensuous motivation necessarily
connected with morality? There are, no doubt, many reasons.
One set of reasons surrounds his discussion of autonomy;
any motivation other than such a purely rational, moral
motivation would be heteronomous, would come from outside; hence, in following it, we would not so much be acting
as be acted upon. But perhaps just as interesting is a related
point: Heteronomous motives are only contingently related
to morally required actions; perhaps we will have theheteronomous motivations necessary to do what is morally required
of us (e.g., perhaps we were born and/or bred to be kindly
persons)-but then again, perhaps not. There is no necessity
that any heternonomous, sensuous motive will be adequate
to move us to do what is morally required; and if these were
the only motives available to us, there would be no certainty
that, in a given instance, we could have done what was morally
required of us. But a purely rational, moral motive, if it exists,
is always and in every case capable of providing a motive
adequate to bring about our doing an action that is otherwise
in our power (e.g., not beyond our physical capability). Thus,
the capability of acting from purely moral motives brings with
it a guarantee of moral responsibility.

A text is more significant for a given point of interpretation, the more explicit it is on that point and the more
prominently placed in the author's text the point is. I must
say, however, that I believe that no text, no matter how
explicit or prominently placed, can by itself overturn an interpretation that is broadly based on a variety of other textual
and argumentative sources; thus, I do not believe that this
text confutes the interpretation of Kant that I have just proposed. (It may be added that one reason I feel this way is that
I do not see any plausible interpretation for this text; there
seems to be no way to make very good sense of it.)

B.
This interpretation makes Kant an "internalist,"
as we have already remarked, but not one who will have to
"trim obligation to the size of individual motives" (1958:
80), since, in Kant's view, the capability for purely moral
motivation will not limit our obligations but will, rather,
serve to guarantee them. I· cannot adequately consider here
whether the kind of motivation which Kant claims lies at the
basis of morality really is a possible kind of motivation
(1965:301-349). I am inclined to believe that such motives
are possible and that this can be seen when we once understand such motives: They cannot be interpreted metaphysically, as Kant did; I find it hard to take seriously Kant's metaphysical story of noumenal causes of moral action. But
perhaps a formula such as the following may be useful, as well
as Kantian in spirit: One acts from morally good motives if
he does what is right for the reasons that it is right. All that
this formula for morally good motives requires is that the
justifying reasons (those features of the situation in virtue of
which an action is corr~ctly concluded to be right, wrong, etc.)
be one and the same as motivating reasons. This may not be an
impossible demand.

The text occurs in the third paragraph of Chapter Three
of the Grundlegung. Kant (190242,4:447) proposes to state
explicitly what the synthetic, a priori proposition to be justified in this chapter is :
Nevertheless the principle of morality is still a
synthetic proposition, namely: "An absolutely
good will is one whose maxim can always have
as its content itself considered as a universal law" ;
for we cannot discover this characteristic of its
maxim by analyzing the concept of an absolutely
good will.
This passage certainly rates high in both explicitness and
prominence. But it is hard to make sense of what Kant has
here said. The proposition that he says is synthetic, a priori is,
or seems to be, the same one that Kant's argument of Chapter
One of the GrundZegung attempted to show to be an analytic
proposition (1974). Thus, I cannot at all see why Kant says
what he says in this passage; he seems to misspeak himself.
And perhaps, fmally, that is the most reasonable interpretation of this passage, as a misspeaking, or as a slip of the pen.
I wish I had a more satisfying proposal to make concerning
the text.
I.et me just note, in conclusion, that if instead of "good
will" in the alleged synthetic a priori proposition, Kant had
written ''rational will," this sentence and the discussion of it
that follows would make much more sense.
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